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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and risk 
of stock price crash in UK firms. We use CEO Pay Slice (CPS) – the fraction of maximum 
top-five executives’ total compensation that goes to the CEO, and board ‘busyness’ – the 
proportion of board level directors who have three or more directorships , to evaluate the 
effect of these two important aspects of corporate governance on stock price crash risk.  The 
CPS reflects relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to 
extract rents and expropriate shareholders wealth (expropriation effect). Board busyness may 
create a serious agency problem because directors are “too busy to mind the business”, 
allowing for executives’ short-termism and bad news hoarding (busyness effect). Using a 
large sample of UK listed companies over the 1997 to 2010 period, we document evidence 
supporting a positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk. In 
line with the expropriation and busyness effects, we find that companies with high CPS and 
high levels of board busyness are exposed to higher level of stock price crash risk. The fact 
that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong implication for the on-
going debate on how to reform executive remuneration so that it provides the right incentives 
to directors. There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the 
number of directorships held by executives from our findings, as we argue that board 
effectiveness depends on the overall level of board business.  
 
JEL classification: G32, G35, G38, J33, L29 
Key words: CEO compensation, CEO pay slice, busy board, corporate governance, agency 
problem, stock price crash risk 
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Introduction  
The finance literature has long examined corporate governance characteristics. Within the 
rapidly developing research on corporate governance, a significant proportion of the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature has concentrated on studying   the relationship between 
governance characteristics and stock price crash risk that is of key importance to many 
managers, investors, and academics. Changes in regulations, asset expropriation, disruptive 
product innovations, market crashes can all provoke stock price crashes. Increases in stock 
price crash risk can result in the decline of expected cash flows and NPVs. When cash flows 
fall below investors’ expectations, managers tend to hide the bad news in order to protect 
their own wealth, human capital, and jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Holmstrom, 1999; 
Benmelegh et al., 2010; Gormley and Matsa, 2011). Once negative firm-specific information 
becomes generally realized, stock price drops dramatically (Jin and Myers, 2006), increasing 
stock price crash risk. A considerable body of literature suggests that corporate governance 
mechanisms can help to prevent suboptimal managerial behaviors and so significantly reduce 
the risk of the firm’s stock price crashing. Still, evidence on the impact of corporate 
governance characteristics on stock price crash risk outside the US is limited.  
In this study, we attempt to throw additional light on the links between corporate 
governance characteristics and stock price crashes in the UK. In particular, we investigate 
whether pay inequality between a company’s CEO and the other top executives, as well as 
board ‘busyness’ affect stock price crash risk of British companies. We define  pay inequality 
as the proportion of top executives’ total compensation that goes to the CEO – which has 
been labeled the CEO Pay Slice (CPS); and we measure corporate board busyness by the 
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proportion of busy directors (directors with three or more directorships) represented at the 
board level. Our main hypothesis is that companies with high CPS and ‘busy’ boards (which 
are both characteristics of weak corporate governance) are more exposed to stock price crash 
risk, all else equal. Explanations of positive relationship between CPS, board busyness and 
stock price crash risk conform to one of the following theoretical frames. First, high CPS may 
be an indication of CEO centrality. Powerful CEO can influence decision making process 
within the board room according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO 
managerial style (whether conservative or aggressive) has been shown to influence important 
corporate decisions (Malmendier et al., 2011). CPS, as a measure of CEO power connected 
directly to stock price crash risk emerging from the implementation of certain corporate 
policies. Second, high-powered compensation packages, combined with information 
asymmetry, in the situations where boards are busy, magnify agency problems, and can also 
incentivize CEO and top executives to take on decisions that may enhance short term 
performance and so increase exposure to the stock price crash risk. Third, due to information 
asymmetry, it is difficult for outsiders to differentiate between managerial actions that 
generate true positive returns from those that generate high returns in order to help managers 
to camouflage the real situation in their companies and protect their jobs, at least for some 
time. Therefore, carefully considered structures of CEO and top executives’ compensation 
packages, coupled with low pay disparity between top executive team members and good 
quality monitoring from non-busy corporate board may be necessary to control stock price 
crash risk exposures.   
The recent corporate scandals around “fat cats” compensation packages in Britain1 are a 
timely reminder that this problem requires further attention. Executive pay has become a 
major issue in recent years in the UK, with shareholders questioning high salaries directors 
                                                          
1
 See BBC News-Business: “High Pay of UK executives corrosive, report says”, 22 November 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15827683 
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receive
2,3
. The British government has been very proactive in tackling compensation-related 
problems. Thus, in 2002, the UK became the first country to mandate an annual non-binding 
shareholder vote on directors’ remuneration (“say on pay”) to improve the “accountability, 
transparency, and performance linkage of executive pay” (Baird and Stowasser, 2003). In 
September 2013, the government went one step further and introduced mandatory ‘say on 
pay’. Shortcomings in regulation of compensation-related issues have been also addressed by 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (The Code), with particular attention being paid to 
the importance of establishing a strong link between directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance
4
, as well as responsibilities of directors for risk oversight and management
5
. In 
our analysis we use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, comprising 692 firms over the 1997 to 2010 period. We control for important 
corporate governance characteristics, such as board composition, board size, CEO- Chairman 
duality, and CEO tenure; we also control for various firm-specific characteristics, which are 
company size, ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, and leverage. Our empirical 
methodology includes the use of panel data and a system GMM estimator. By using this 
estimator, we avoid problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity and potential 
endogeneity of regressors. The system GMM estimator is also considered as more efficient 
                                                          
2
 See The Wall Street Journal – Business: “U.K. Unveils Plan on Executive Pay”, 20 June, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577478172485959522 
3
 “There is compelling evidence of a disconnect between pay and performance in large UK listed companies”, 
UK Business Secretary Vince Cable told Parliament; David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, also criticised 
boardroom cronies who helped each other “fill their boots” while the country was forced to tighten its belt. 
"We've got to deal with the merry-go-round where there are too many cases of remuneration committee 
members sitting on each other's boards, patting each other's backs and handing out each other's pay rises," he 
said. "We need to redefine the word 'fair'. We need to try to give people a sense that we have a vision at the end 
of this, of a fairer, better economy, a fairer, better society, where if you work hard and do the right thing you get 
rewarded” , 7 January, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jan/07/david-cameron-fat-cat-pay 
4
 Section D: Remuneration. Main Principle: “Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain, and 
motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying 
more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be 
structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
June 2010: p.22). 
5
Section C2: Risk Management and Internal Control. Main Principle: “The board is responsible for determining 
the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board 
should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.” 
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than other instrumental variable techniques in controlling for the possible endogeneity of 
explanatory variables (see Almeida et al., 2010). 
Throughout our analysis, we find consistent support for the proposition that higher CPS 
and board busyness are associated with higher stock price crash risk. Our results strongly 
support the expropriation and busyness arguments
6
. Thus, a high CPS level could be due to 
an agency problem in firms with powerful and influential CEO, who is able to stockpile 
negative information from the market for financial (expropriation of rents through the 
compensation arrangements)
7
 or non-financial reasons (e.g., empire building with a view to 
expropriating future rents)
8
. However, upon the realization of this (negative) information by 
the market, company’s stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). In 
addition, high CPS could demotivate other executive directors, destroy team cooperation 
within the boardroom, and lead to poor board and firm performance (the so-called social 
comparison effect, which is especially pronounced on the British boards
9
). In turn, busy 
boards are associated with weak corporate governance and also contribute to high agency 
problems.
10
 Therefore, companies with busy corporate boards are likely to experience high 
stock price crash risk. Our results indicate that CPS and board busyness can provide a useful 
tool for research on stock price crash risk, which is an important issue to be considered in the 
UK context.  
Our study is related to different streams of the literature. First, extent research shows 
that proportion of compensation received by CEOs has been trending up over time (Bebchuk 
and Grinstein, 2005; Frydman, 2005, Frydman and Saks, 2010 among others). We add to this 
                                                          
6
 See Section 4.2 of this chapter for detailed discussion of theories.  
7
 See Kothari et al., 2009.  
8
 See Ball, 2001. 
9
 See Zalewska (2014a,b) for detailed discussion of UK board mechanisms and structures.  
10
 See Gilson (1990); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (1996); 
Beasly (1996); Cotter et al. (1997); Core et al. (1999); Brown and Maloney (1999); Shivdasni and Yermack 
(1999); Miwa and Ramseyer (2000); Bohren and Strom (2001); Ferris et al. Pritchard (2003); Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006); and Cooper and Uzun (2012). 
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literature stream by investigating the relationship between CPS and stock price crash risk in 
the UK. Second, we contribute by analyzing the association between different corporate 
governance characteristics and stock price crash risk. Thus, scholars discuss impact of large 
shareholders and institutional investors (An and Zhang, 2013), the opacity of financial reports 
(Hutton et al., 2009), and CEO incentives and power (Kim et al., 2011a). We contribute to 
this literature by considering other aspects of governance arrangement, the CPS and board 
busyness, and their impact on stock price crash risk. Finally, our work enhances the literature 
that analyzes different CEO qualities and characteristics and their effect on firm outcomes. 
We highlight CPS and board busyness as important features which can provide additional 
insight into understanding the link between corporate governance characteristics and stock 
price crash risk. This is the first study that we are aware of, highlighting the above mentioned 
aspects using the UK-based sample.  
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. We provide theoretical background 
and develop hypothesis in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains the sample description and 
summary statistics. Section 4.4 outlines the methodology used for the analysis. Section 4.5 
examines the relationship between CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk.  Section 
4.6 provides results of additional tests. Section 4.7 concludes.  
Related literature and hypothesis development  
Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The Existing Evidence 
An extensive body of literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms can help to 
prevent sub-optimal managerial behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Healy et al., 1999). 
Good corporate governance practices discipline investments (Masulis et al., 2007), prevent 
earnings management (Xie et al., 2003), improve information disclosure process (Armstrong 
et al., 2012; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and align interests of managers and shareholders 
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(Benmelegh et al., 2010 among others). Ironically, the structure of executives’ compensation 
- which is supposed to align interests of managers and shareholders - may also trigger agency 
problems. Accordingly, Healy (1985), Beneish (1999), Ke (2005), Burns and Kedia (2006), 
Johnson et al. (2009), Kedia and Philippon (2010) argue that stock-based compensation leads  
to accounting fraud, misreporting, and earnings mismanagement, followed by the stock price 
overvaluation and collapse.  
Benmelegh et al. (2010) demonstrate that stock-based CEO compensation can cause 
stock price crashes. They identify conditions under which stock-based compensation leads to 
suboptimal investment, misreporting, and a subsequent sharp decline in equity prices. 
Benmelegh et al. (2010) argue that CEOs of medium – to high-growth firms initially have to 
invest intensively in order to make a better use of growth opportunities. When growth rates 
slow down, CEOs can camouflage growth decline by making suboptimal investment 
decisions, resulting in subsequent stock price collapse. Kim et al. (2011b) provide empirical 
evidence supporting results of Benmelegh et al. (2010). 
An and Zhang (2013) explore the relationship between institutional investors’ 
ownership and stock price crash risk, and conclude that strong monitoring by dedicated 
institutional investors attenuates managers’ bad-news hoarding, and so prevents rapid stock 
price drop. Andreou et al. (2013) consider several corporate governance characteristics and 
their effects on firm-specific future stock price crashes. They find that future stock price 
crashes are positively related to institutional ownership, percentage of directors who hold 
company’s shares, and opacity of financial reports. Conversely, the percentage of 
independent directors on the audit committee and auditor’s industry experience are negatively 
related to stock price crashes.  
Gormley et al. (2013) consider unanticipated changes in firm’s business environments, 
which lead to increased stock price crash risks. Gormley et al. (2013) examine managers’ 
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reaction to increases in business risks as a function of their pre-existing equity-based 
incentives. They find that structure of managerial compensation has an important effect on 
managerial motivation to induce firm’s level of risk and firm’s response to stock price crash 
risks
11
. These findings are consistent with those in Gormley and Matsa (2011), who argue 
that agency conflicts can be mitigated by reducing managers’ exposure to firm risk12.   
CEO’s management style can also influence firm risk. Managerial style affects 
corporate risk management throughout the impact that personal CEO characteristics have on 
vital corporate decisions and policies. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that all investment, 
financing, and other organizational policies depend on specific managerial attributes. They 
argue that older managers are more conservative, while managers who hold an MBA degree 
are more aggressive. Malmendier et al. (2011) find that CEO’s previous experience and 
his/her personal expertise gained over the prior crises (the “Depression baby” effect), 
influence companies’ financing and investment policies. Malmendier et al. (2011) also state 
that overconfident CEOs believe that all their decisions are value maximizing, and boards 
have to use various tools in order to constrain such CEOs. They argue that executives’ 
compensation packages need to account for the particular managerial style (conservative or 
aggressive) arising from managers’ past experience to make financial incentives effective.  
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) investigate the importance of risk control for bank holding 
companies (BHC). They hypothesize that company’s risk culture13 determines both the risk 
appetite and the strength of the risk management system. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) 
differentiate between risk cultures that follow “business model channel” or “hedging 
                                                          
11
 Gormley et al. (2013) recommend that, in designing executives’ compensation packages, boards should 
consider the potential changes in companies’ risk environment and how executives will respond given their 
compensation levels. 
12
Gormley and Matsa (2011) advise that executives’ exposure to firm risk can be reduced if the stock-based 
component in their compensation packages is reduced. 
13
 Kimbrough and Componation (2009) argue that company’s organisational culture plays an important role in 
areas such as implementation of new initiatives, its reaction to changes in the market and its ability to navigate 
major changes in its business environment. 
9 
 
channel”14.  Conservative (aggressive) companies with “business model channel” culture take 
lower (higher) risk and have stronger (weaker) risk management in place; in contrast, under 
the “hedging channel” culture, aggressive (conservative) companies undertake high (low) risk 
coupled with a strong (weak) risk management. By evaluating companies’ response to 
unexpected losses during the 1998 Russian crisis, they find evidence supporting the business 
model channel culture, i.e., companies with high tail risk had a weaker risk management 
system in place. This result is consistent with findings in Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), who find 
that financial institutions which performed worst during the 1998 crisis also demonstrated the 
worst performance during the 2007- 2008 crisis.  
CPS and Stock price crash risk.  
Weak corporate governance can result in CEO-dominated firms (Jiraporn et al., 2005). The 
importance of a “dominant player” in corporate decision making cannot be underestimated 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011). However, there is a risk that influential CEO can hide problems from 
the board (Jiraporn et al., 2005; Walkling, 2010). If board does not have all necessary 
information, board becomes less effective and problems are likely to remain hidden until 
“revealed by a disaster” (Walkling, 2010: p.17). There is also an exposure to expropriation 
risk, which results from rent extractions by dominant CEOs (Walkling, 2010). Rent 
extraction by company insiders, including CEOs affects corporate investment, cost of funds, 
company growth, and stock returns (see Becht et al., 2003).  
To identify CEO dominancy, Bebchuk et al. (2011) use ‘CEO pay slice (CPS)’ - the 
proportion of the aggregate salary of top five executive directors that goes to the CEO. High 
CPS level signals agency problems in companies with dominant CEO and weak corporate 
governance. A powerful and authoritative CEO is able to influence the structure of his/her 
                                                          
14
 The latter so called because it is consistent with the main predictions of hedging theories in Smith and Stulz 
(1985);and in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). 
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own compensation contract in a way that allows him/her to expropriate rents at the expense 
of shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Jiraporn et al., 2005). Studies by Blanchard et al. 
(1994), Yermack (1997) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) determine that some features 
of compensation packages reflect rent-seeking by executives. Jiraporn et al. (2005) - 
investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate governance
15
, and also 
find evidence supporting the rent expropriation argument.  
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) and interpret a high CPS as a sign of a CEO 
centrality. A dominant CEO could influence decision making processes within a board room 
according to his/her own managerial style and risk preferences. CEO managerial style 
(conservative or aggressive) influences important corporate decisions (Malmendier et al.  
2011) and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). Hence, CPS might be connected 
directly to the stock price crash risk, which emerges as a result of implementation of certain 
corporate policies. High CPS magnifies agency problems, and might incentivize a CEO to 
take on decisions (e.g., financing, investment and dividend decision) that enable him/her to 
extract rents and so expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Thus, for example, a dominant CEO 
could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits, and 
hide true information from the board of directors, so increasing company’s exposure to stock 
price crash risk. These arguments lead us to the following (expropriation) hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: CPS is positively associated with stock price crash risk.  
Busy Boards and Stock price crash risk  
The agency theory literature suggests that directors who overstretch themselves and accept 
additional seats on more boards due to the associated extra personal  perquisites, tend to 
spend less time on each individual board, so compromising their responsibilities and 
                                                          
15
 Jiraporn et al. (2005) use shareholder rights as a measure of the corporate governance standard. 
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neglecting their duties (Ferris et al., 2003)
16
. Holding multiple directorships might negatively 
affect monitoring and advisory capacity of the board. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and 
Core et al. (1999) argue that directors with multiple seats “cater for CEOs”, and that multiple 
board appointments correlate with excess CEO compensation, implying that such directors 
serve an inadequate check on management. Busy directors have a higher propensity to be 
absent from board meetings neglecting their duties by not taking part in the strategic 
decisions-making processes (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Beasly (1996) provides evidence that the 
number of board seats held by supervisory directors exhibits positive correlation with 
accounting fraud, and points to the lack of attention from these directors. Busy directors tend 
to take care of their own reputation and to leave underperforming companies, suggesting that 
the presence of overstretched directors may be endogenous to firm performance (Brown and 
Maloney, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).   
Despite the fact that busy directors are proficient and knowledgeable in their field, 
they are not able to use these skills to their full advantage, because their multiple 
responsibilities can create high levels of distraction. Cooper and Uzun (2012) find that 
directors who are less distracted in terms of other directorships and high-level corporate 
responsibilities tend to monitor banks better. Banks with less busy directors are less risky 
than banks with busy directors. Christy et al. (2009) also examine the links between corporate 
governance and equity risk, focusing on the board of directors, and find a negative 
relationship between the market risk of equity and multiple directorships held by independent 
board members.  
Information asymmetry
17
 might be especially pronounced in the presence of busy 
                                                          
16
 See also Gilson (1990); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) 
(1996); Beasly (1996); Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997); Core et al.(1999); Brown and Maloney (1999); 
Shivdasni and Yermack (1999); Miwa and Ramseyer (2000); Bohren and Strom (2001); Ferris et al. (2003); 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006); Cooper and Uzun (2012) who challenge the wisdom of holding too many 
directorships by examining busy boards’ effectiveness. 
17
By hiding bad information from shareholders and prospective investors, CEO magnifies information 
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boards, due to the inability of busy directors to provide thorough monitoring and to identify 
problems in a timely manner. Busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in 
severe agency problems, due to poor monitoring. This might result in CEO’s and top 
executives’ short-termism and might increase company’s exposure to stock price crash risk. 
A CEO with a busy board might be incentivized to camouflage real situation in the company 
in order to protect himself/herself from job loss and to secure private benefits, at least for a 
time. However, upon the release of negative firm-specific information, company faces a 
shock, which leads to the increase in its stock price crash risk. Considering the above 
arguments and results from previous research, we hypothesize that in the presence of busy 
boards, firms are more exposed to the stock price crash risk and propose the following 
(busyness) hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Busy boards are positively associated with stock price crash risk.  
 
1.0 The effect of industry competition and financial crisis on the relationship between 
CPS, board busyness and stock price crash risk 
Giroud and Mueller (2010) argue that effect of corporate governance on agency 
problem depends on industry competition. When competition is high, ‘bad’ managers are 
penalized by the market and the importance of the monitoring element of corporate 
governance is reduced.  
Johnson et al. (2000),  Mitton (2002), and Lemmon and Lins (2003) among others, 
advise that stock prices of companies with weak corporate governance  drop more when the 
economy contracts because the extraction of private benefits by executives may be greater 
during recessions, when the expected rate of return on investment falls. Companies with 
higher CPS and busier boards might be exposed to higher stock price crash risk during 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
asymmetry.  
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periods of market instability.   
Considering the above arguments, we hypothesize that effect of CPS and board 
busyness on stock price crash risk might be stronger in the industries with low competition 
and especially pronounced when markets are turbulent.   
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is 
stronger in industries with lower level of competition.  
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of CPS and board busyness on stock price crash risk is 
more pronounced during the recession periods.  
Sample Selection and Data Description 
The Sample 
We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. We 
collect firms’ financial and market information from the Thompson Datastream, whereas 
corporate governance and directors’ compensation information is from the BoardEx database. 
The sample period is from 1997 to 2010 and includes all firms whose information is available 
from these two sources. 
The BoardEx database consists of directors’ information, including name, role title 
and description, indication of whether director is executive or supervisory director, the 
number of years each director served on the board and in his/her current role, director’s total, 
cash/direct and equity compensation, and the number of quoted companies’ boards on which 
each director currently sits. From this database, we obtain data for non-financial firms for 
which there is information available for at least two executive board members and a company 
has a CEO.  
We collect accounting and stock market data necessary to calculate risk measures and 
14 
 
to control for firm characteristics from the Thompson Datastream, including weekly prices,
18
 
book value of assets, market value of equity, and value of total debt at the end of each year.  
We merge data from BoardEx and Datastream, and select companies with at least five 
consecutive years of data
19
. After all, we have an unbalanced panel of 692 firms over the 
1997 – 2010 time period.   
Variable definition  
We use three proxies for stock price crash risk in our study: Tail Risk, Negative 
Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. We follow Andreou et al. (2013), and Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) in our definitions of crash risk proxies. Our first measure is Tail Risk. In a 
given year Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average return on the company’s stock 
over the 5% of its worst return weeks (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013).  
Our second measure is the Extreme Sigma. It is defined as a negative of the worst 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns 
divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (see Andreou et al., 2013). 
For a given firm i in a year t, the extreme sigma is computed as:  
𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑇 = −𝑀𝑖𝑛 [
𝑊𝑖,𝑡−?̅?𝑖,𝑇
𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇
]     (7) 
Where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡is the firm-specific weekly return; ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 is the average firm-specific weekly 
return in the fiscal year, and 𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇 is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns. 
The firm-specific weekly return for firm i in the week t defined as Wi,t= ln(1+εi,t),  where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
represents the residuals from the expanded index model regression (8):  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽5,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
Where ri,t is the return on stock i in the week t, and rm,t is the return on the FTSE All-
share index in the week t. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and include lead and lag variables 
                                                          
18
 We use weekly prices for the computation of our risk proxies.  
19
 We use system GMM estimator for our analysis, which requires having at least five consecutive years of data.   
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for the market index in a regression which separates market-wide return movements from 
firm returns, so that residuals capture weekly firm-specific returns.  
The third measure is the Negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW). Following Kim 
(2011a, 2011b), An and Zhang (2013) and Andreou (2013) we calculate NCSKEW by taking 
the negative of the third central moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from 
the company’s annual mean return, scaled by the sample variance of firm-specific weekly 
return raised to the power of 3/2. Specifically, we compute NCSKEW for the firm i in fiscal 
year t as:   
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝐼,𝑇 = −
[𝑛(𝑛−1)
3
2 ∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑡−?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
3𝑛
𝑇=1 ]
[(𝑛−1)(𝑛−2)(∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑡− ?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
2𝑛
𝑇=1 )
3
2]
         (9) 
where 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is the firm-specific weekly return, ?̅?𝑖,𝑇 is the average firm-specific weekly 
return in the fiscal year, and n is the number of observations in the year t. 
Scaling the raw third moment by cubed standard deviation is a standard normalization 
employed for skewness in statistics that allows for a comparison across returns with different 
variances. We follow the literature by putting a minus sign in front of the skewness so that an 
increase in NCSKEW corresponds to more crash risk, i.e., a more negatively-skewed stock 
return distribution.  
Our definition of CPS is marginally different from that in Bebchuk et al. (2011). We 
compute CPS as a fraction of the total compensation of a group of top executives (minimum 
two and maximum five), that is received by the CEO
20
. We follow Ferris et al. (2003) in our 
definition of busy boards, and consider directors busy if they have seats on boards of three or 
more listed companies. We control for other influences on crash risk, found to be important 
in the previous studies (see Andreou et al., 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013 among others), 
                                                          
20
British corporate boards are, on average smaller than American boards. Only 16% of our sample companies 
have five or more executive directors at the board level.  
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and include firm size, capital expenditures, and leverage in our models. We also collect 
information about each firm’s governance structure, such as board size, board composition, 
CEO tenure, CEO duality, whether the CEO is insider or outsider (i.e. was/was not a firm 
employee before being appointed to the CEO position). Variable definitions are provided in 
Table 4.1.  Tables 4.2 and 4.3 give sample calculation examples for CPS and Board Busyness. 
***Insert Tables 1, 2, and 3 here*** 
 
Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.4
21
. We separate our data into variables describing 
crash risk (Panel A); compensation, director characteristics and board structure (Panel B); 
and firm characteristics (Panel C). The mean value of Tail Risk is 0.14, and of Negative 
Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma are 0.12 and 2.88 respectively, which are in line 
with those reported in Andreou et al. (2013), Kim et al. (2011a) and Bradshaw et al. (2011). 
The average CEO pay slice (CPS) based on the total compensation of up to top five 
executives( including CEO) is 44.98% (minimum 0%, maximum 100%). The average board 
busyness is 17.11%, i.e. 17.11% of directors held seats on least two other boards at the same 
time. There are some companies that do not have busy directors at all and some with 66.67% 
busy directors at the board level. The average board in our sample has 7 directors.  The 
average proportion of executive directors at the board level (Board Composition) was 47.89% 
with a minimum of 20% and a maximum 80% of executives represented at the board. The 
average CEO tenure is 5.16 years in our sample companies, with minimum 0 and maximum 
24.70 years. 53.82% of the companies in our sample have CEOs, who had not previously 
been company employees (Outside CEO). 9% of our sample companies have CEOs who 
chair the board at the same time.  
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Firm size is, on average 4.65. Leverage level in the average company is 17.72%, with 
maximum leverage equals to 95%, and minimum leverage equals to 0%. The maximum 
(minimum) ratio of capital expenditures to total assets is 0.34 (0), with the average being 
equal to 0.05.  
*******Insert Table 4******* 
Research design 
We use a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM)
22
 estimator in our analysis. The 
GMM estimator has the following advantages: (1) it allows to include firm fixed effects to 
account for the firm’s unobserved heterogeneity; (2) it considers the impact of previous stock 
price crashes on the current state of corporate governance in a firm; (3) it accounts for 
simultaneity by using a combination of variables from a firm’s history as valid instruments 
(Wintoki et al., 2012).  
We estimate the effect of governance characteristics on risk, conditional on firm 
heterogeneity, by using the following empirical model
23
: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝑘𝑠𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠  s=1,…, p,    (1) 
Where vectors X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm and risk characteristics, 
respectively; 𝛽 captures the effect of governance on firm’s risk; η is an unobserved firm 
effect, and 𝜖𝑖 is a random error term.  
The estimation procedure involves two important steps. First, we take the first 
differences of (1): 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑘𝑝 ∑ ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾∆𝑍𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜖𝑖𝑡,   𝑝 > 0𝑝     (2) 
and eliminate all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. We use GMM to estimate (2), and 
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 The dynamic panel GMM estimator, which was developed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988); Arellano and Bond 
(1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); and Blundell and Bond (1998), improves on ordinary least squares estimates 
(OLS) and fixed effects estimates. 
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We follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Wintoki et al. (2012) in this approach.  
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use lagged values of stock price crash risk, corporate governance and firm-specific variables 
as instruments for these variables. There are two important criteria defining the validity of 
these instruments: first, they must provide a source of variation for current governance, i.e.,  
 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑡−𝑘, 𝑋𝑡−𝑘 , 𝑍𝑡−𝑘), where k>p, and X, Z, and y are corporate governance, firm, 
and risk characteristics, respectively. Second, lagged values must be exogenous in order to be 
valid instruments. For the exogeniety assumptions to be valid, we need the following 
orthogonality conditions to hold: 
𝐸(𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0, ∀𝑠 > 𝑝   (3) 
We can then estimate (2) using GMM and considering orthogonality conditions (3). However, 
there are econometric shortcomings associated with this procedure. First, “if [the] original 
model is conceptually in levels” (Wintoki, 2012: p.588), differencing will reduce the 
variation in the explanatory variables and consequently, the power of the tests (Beck et al.. 
2000). Second, variables in levels may be weak instruments for first-differenced equations 
(Arrelano and Bover, 1995). Third, first differencing may worsen the impact of measurement 
errors on the dependent variables (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).  
Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that it is possible to 
mitigate these shortcomings and improve the GMM estimator by including the equations in 
levels in the estimation procedure. It is then possible to use first-differenced variables as 
instruments for the equations in levels in a “stacked” system of equations that includes 
equations in both levels and differences, resulting in a system GMM estimator that involves 
estimating the following system: 
[
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡
] = 𝛼 + 𝑘 [
𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑝
] + 𝛽 [
𝑋𝑖𝑡
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡
] + 𝛾 [
𝑍𝑖𝑡
∆𝑍𝑖𝑡
] + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (4) 
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity in level equation, we make a reasonable 
assumption that correlation between governance/firm characteristics and unobserved effects 
(such as, for example managerial ability, managerial productivity, etc.) will be constant over 
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time. This assumption requires additional orthogonality conditions:  
𝐸[∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸[∆𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸[∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡)] = 0, ∀𝑠 > 𝑝 (5) 
We carry out GMM panel estimation considering the orthogonality conditions of (3) 
and (5), and assume no serial correlation in the error term, ϵ. The orthogonality conditions 
imply that we can use lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equations and lagged 
differences as instruments for the level equations, respectively.  
To verify a key exogeniety assumption that the firm’s historical risk and 
characteristics are exogenous with respect to current shocks or innovations in risk, we also 
test for the second-order serial correlation
24
 and over-identification
25
, as suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991).  
As a potential concern with our analysis could be that the relationship between corporate 
governance and stock price crash risk is dynamically endogenous, i.e. that company’s past 
stock price crash risk determines both current corporate governance arrangements and current 
risk (see Wintoki et al.(2012) and Ellul and Erramilli (2013)). We follow Ellul and Erramilli 
(2013), and address this concern by analyzing a relationship between corporate governance 
and stock price crash risk using a dynamic panel GMM estimator in the following form:  
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡    +  𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡   
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡
14
𝑗=2
+  𝜀 𝑖𝑡                    (𝟔) 
Where Crash Risk is one of our three proxies for the stock price crash risk defined as Tail 
Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. All variable definitions are 
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 For the GMM estimates, if the assumptions of the specification are valid, by construction the residuals in first 
differences (AR(1)) should be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)). 
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 Multiple lags are used as instruments in the dynamic panel GMM model. Hence, the system is over-identified 
and test of over-identification has to be carried out. The Hansen test provides a J-statistic, which is distributed as 
χ2 under the null hypothesis of the validity of instruments. 
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provided in Table 4.1.  
Results  
In this section we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between corporate 
governance characteristics such as CPS and board busyness and Crash Risk, measured by 
three different proxies, i.e., Tail Risk, Negative Conditional Skewness, and Extreme Sigma. 
Our models include the standard controls used in the literature. Thus, we control for firm size 
(log of firm’s market value), firm capital expenditures and leverage; we also control for the 
board size, board composition, CEO-Chairman duality, CEO tenure, whether the CEO is 
insider (i.e., was a company employee before being appointed CEO) or outsider, and year 
dummy. We run few tests to check for the potential misspecification of our estimation model. 
First, we use the Hansen J statistics of overidentification restrictions to check for the validity 
of our chosen instruments and, second, we use m2 statistics, developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) to test for the lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
and find no such problem in our model.  
The results are displayed in Table 4.5, and provide consistent evidence that corporate 
governance mechanisms are significantly associated with stock price crashes. Specifically, 
we find that coefficients on CPS are positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in 
all our models, indicating that stock price crash risk is higher when CPS is high. High CPS 
magnifies the agency problem, and is a form of rent extraction by a dominant CEO. It might 
incentivize a CEO to prioritize short-term goals in order to secure his/her own private 
benefits and expropriate wealth from shareholders. In addition, a CEO can hide problems 
from the board for some time until bad news is “revealed by disaster” (Walkling, 2010: p.17). 
CEO’s short-termism combined with bad news hoarding, increases company’s exposure to 
stock price crash risk. These results support the Expropriation Hypothesis (H1), and are in 
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line with results from existing theoretical and empirical literature (see Jiraporn et al., 2005; 
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2010; and Andreou et al., 2013 among others). There is also strong 
evidence that board busyness is positively related to stock price crashes. Multiple 
responsibilities of busy directors create a high level of distraction. Information asymmetry is 
especially pronounced in the presence of busy boards due to inability of busy directors to 
perform comprehensive monitoring and to identify problems. As a result, a company’s 
exposure to stock price crash risk increases. The coefficients on board busyness are positive 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level) supporting the Busyness Hypothesis (H2), and 
consistent with the view that companies with busy directors are more at risk of their stock 
price crashing (Cooper and Uzun, 2012; Christy et al., 2009).  
Moving to control variables included in the regressions, we find some interesting 
results. Board Composition, our measure of board independence, has negative and 
statistically significant (at 1% and 5% levels) coefficients. These results  support the view 
that higher level of board independence is beneficial to the company, i.e., companies with 
such boards face lower Stock price crash risk. Board size has positive and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) coefficients, supporting the view that small boards are more 
efficient and perform better than their larger counterparts when it comes to managing 
company risks. CEO tenure is positive and statistically significant (at 1% and 5% levels) in 
all models, indicating that CEOs with longer tenure may be entrenched, and more likely to 
use their power to camouflage bad news, enhancing companies’ Stock price crash risk. We 
find a negative relationship between the CEO - Chairman Duality and our proxies for the 
stock price crash risk. CEO-Chairman duality results in a higher level of power concentration 
in hands of one person, who can influence a board of directors. The reason for the negative 
relation between duality and stock price crash risk could be that such duality will result in 
better CEO knowledge and expertise, and might affect his/her level of risk aversion. More 
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powerful CEOs may be more likely to protect the company and themselves from future 
possible financial inconveniences and make relatively safe investments, associated with 
lower risk levels. Our results reveal a negative relation between Outside CEOs and firms’ 
crash risk. To protect their own reputational capital, outside CEOs may avoid opportunistic 
behavior and bad news hoarding, so minimizing stock price crash risk.  
We also find firm Size (measured as natural logarithm of market value of equity) is 
negatively related to stock price crash risk with all coefficients being statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  The reason for this negative relation might be that larger firms are more 
stable and less exposed to such a risk. Our analysis also reveals that leverage and capital 
expenditures positively affect crash risk. These results are in line with our expectations and 
are in agreement with findings from previous literature (see Kim et al., 2011a, An and Zhang, 
2013).  
***Insert Table 5 here*** 
 
Further tests  
Effect of industry competition on the stock price crashes 
In accordance with agency theory, effective corporate governance helps to alleviate 
managerial opportunism by reducing the information asymmetry that exists between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Effect of corporate governance on 
agency problem depends on industry competition (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). When 
competition is high, ‘bad’ managers are penalized by the market and the importance of the 
monitoring element of corporate governance is reduced. We follow Andreou et al. (2013) and 
measure industry competition by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is 
calculated as the sum of squared market shares as follow:  
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
2
𝑁𝐽
𝑖=1
 
Where Si,j,t is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market share is 
calculated using firm sales. We estimate industry competition for each of the 15 FTAG3 
industry classifications. High values of HHI values indicate weaker industry competition.  
We split our sample in two groups, high and low competition, based on the value of 
HHI at year t-1 (HHI value lower than the median identifies the high competition group, and 
HHI value higher than the median identifies the low competition group). We re-estimate our 
baseline models from Table 4.5 for the two subsamples separately to identify the impact of 
corporate governance on stock price crashes in the different regimes. The results are shown in 
Table 4.6. The results are consistent with the results from the baseline models from Table 4.5.  
However, we find that the influence of corporate governance on stock price crashes is 
stronger in industries with low competition. These findings are in line with findings of Giroid 
and Mueller (2010), who stress on the importance of effective corporate governance for 
companies in industries where competition is low.  
***Insert Table 6 here*** 
The effect of corporate governance characteristics during the 2007-08 financial crisis 
Johnson et al. (2000); Mitton (2002); and Lemmon and Lins (2003) among others, argue that 
stock prices of companies with weak corporate governance drop more when economy 
contracts. This is due to the extraction of private benefits by executives, which may be 
greater during recessions, when the expected rate of return on investment falls. We 
investigate the effect of corporate governance on stock price crashes during the recent 
financial crisis. We follow An and Zhang (2013) in identify years 2007 and 2008 as the crisis 
years. We use a dummy variable for the crisis years, and include it in our baseline model 
from Table 4.5. We also check whether CPS and board busyness have more pronounced 
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effects on the stock price crashes during these years by including the interaction variables, 
CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The results are represented in Table 4.7.  
When Tail Risk is used as a proxy for the stock price crash, the Crisis variable is 
positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level), indicating the increased stock price 
crash risk of firms during the financial crisis. Other variables of interest are the interaction 
variables CPS x Crisis and Board_Busyness x Crisis. The impact of CPS during the crisis 
becomes negative and statistically significant when Tail risk is used as a measure of stock 
price crash. A plausible explanation is that high CPS motivates CEO to perform better during 
turbulent periods, i.e., if CEO with high CPS can manage to reduce stock price crash risk 
during the crisis years, he/she continues to enjoy career benefits in form of high CPS. 
However, Board_Busyness x Crisis is not significant at the conventional level, which 
suggests that the association between board busyness and stock price crash risk is not 
significantly different during the financial crisis. When Negative Conditional skewness is 
used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the Crisis variable is also positive and statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) indicating that stock price crash during the financial crisis 
increases. The impact of CPS during the crisis becomes negative, but is not statistically 
significant, while Board_Busyness x Crisis is positive and significant (at the 1% level), 
suggesting that firms with busy boards were more exposed to stock price crash risk during the 
crisis years. When Extreme Sigma is used as a proxy for stock price crash risk, the impact of 
CPS during the crisis becomes negative but is not statistically significant.  Board_Busyness x 
Crisis is also positive and significant (at the 5% level), which suggests that firms with busy 
boards face higher stock price crash risks during the crisis years. Overall, the results from 
Table 4.7 provide some indication that the financial crisis affects stock price crash risks in a 
positive way. The results are also suggest that during the crisis years, CPS could have a 
negative impact on stock price crash risk of firms; whereas, board busyness affects stock 
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price crash risk in a positive way.  
***Insert Table 7 here*** 
Conclusion 
We investigate how governance characteristics affect firms’ risk of experiencing a stock price 
crash. In our analysis, we use governance variables that capture board busyness and so-called 
CEO centrality. We use CEO pay slice (CPS) as a proxy for the CEO centrality and estimate 
board busyness as a proportion of busy directors on a firm’s board. We offer new insights by 
evaluating the role of CPS and Board Busyness on the stock price crash risk by analyzing 
Expropriation and Busyness Hypotheses.   
High CPS magnifies agency problems and might incentivize a CEO to take on 
decisions that enable to extract rents and expropriate shareholder wealth. A dominant CEO 
could prioritize short-term price maximization to secure his/her own private benefits and hide 
true information from the board of directors increasing company’s exposure to stock price 
crash risks. In turn, busy boards with overcommitted directors could result in the severe 
agency problem; they (busy boards) might be unable to monitor management effectively. 
Weak corporate boards encourage CEO’s opportunistic behaviors and short-termism and 
company’s exposure to stock price crash risks increase. 
Our analysis reveals a positive association between CPS, board busyness and stock 
price crash risk. Companies with high CPS and busy boards tend to be more exposed to stock 
price crash risks. The results of our study are robust when controlling for various firm, board 
and CEO characteristics, including board composition, board size, CEO/Chairman duality, 
CEO tenure and whether CEO was previously a company employee, as well as firm size, 
value of capital expenditures, and leverage; and to different regime specifications, including 
different levels of industry competition. Our findings are in line with findings in  Andreou et 
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al. (2013), An and Zhang (2013), and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). However, this is the first 
study that we are aware of which investigates the governance – stock price crash risk 
relationship using the UK-based sample.  
Motivated by the changes in remuneration practices introduced by the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) and the “say on pay” law (2013), we find that CPS is an important 
aspect of firm governance and management, that deserves attention of both researches and 
policy makers.  The fact that CPS positively impacts on stock price crash risk has a strong 
implication for the on-going debate about how to reform executive remuneration so that it 
provides the right incentives. Our findings highlight the importance of considering 
remuneration issues at the board, rather than just at the CEO level, and support The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) principles
26
. Even if a CEO compensation package is 
perfectly structured and implemented, it does not guarantee that it will lead to improvements 
in the firm riskiness, as it may provoke resistance of other board members. As corporate 
governance reforms move towards increasing boards’ responsibilities for risk and 
performance, it is important to consider board-wide remuneration issues without narrowing 
them to the CEO’s compensation.  
There is also a direct implication for the public debate on limitation of the number of 
directorships held by executives from our findings.   While the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (1996) put forward a threshold of three directorships, and the Council of 
Institutional Investors (2003) argues that directors with full-time jobs should not participate 
in more than two other boards in order to guarantee that they can give adequate service, we 
argue that board effectiveness depends also on its overall level of busyness, i.e. on the 
proportion of busy directors at the board level.    
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conditions elsewhere in the group” (Supporting principle, Section D: Remuneration, The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010: p. 22).  
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
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All data variables in this table refer to the corresponding compensation and corporate 
governance variable identifiers in the BoardEx annual database and to the corresponding risk 
and firm characteristics variables identifiers in the Tomson Datastream database. 
Variable Definition 
 
Crash Risk  
 
Tail Risk 
 
 
 
The negative of the average return on the company’s stock over 
the 5% worst return weeks for the company’s stock 
 
Extreme Sigma 
 
The negative of the worst deviation of firm-specific weekly 
returns from the average firm-specific weekly returns divided by 
the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
 
𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑅_𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑖,𝑇 = −𝑀𝑖𝑛 [
𝑊𝑖,𝑡−?̅?𝑖,𝑇
𝜎𝑊𝑖,𝑇
]  
 
Negative conditional 
skewness 
 
The negative conditional skewness.  we calculate negative 
conditional skewness by taking the negative of the third central 
moment of firm-specific deviations of weekly returns from the 
company’s annual mean return scaled by the sample variance of 
the same raised to the power of 3/2. 
 
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝐼,𝑇 = −[𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3/2 ∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
3𝑛
𝑇=1 ]/
[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑ (𝑊𝑖,𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑇)
2𝑛
𝑇=1 )
3/2
]      
 
 
Corporate Governance  
 
 
CEO pay slice (CPS) 
 
 
 
The fraction of the total compensation to the group of minimum 
top-two and maximum top-five executives, including CEO that is 
received by the CEO. 
 
Board busyness The proportion of busy directors at the board level. Busy directors 
are defined as directors holding three or more directorships, 
including the “home” company, in the public companies at the 
same time. 
 
Board composition The proportion of executive directors on the board. Total number 
of supervisory directors divided by the total number of all 
directors on the board. 
 
Board size The natural logarithm of the total number of all directors on the 
board. 
 
CEO tenure The   number of years directors have served on the board 
 
Duality Indicator variable: equals one if CEO and Chairman is the same 
person 
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CEO outsider CEO Outsider is a dummy equal to one, if CEO was working at 
the firm for less than one year before becoming CEO. 
 
  
 
Firm characteristics 
 
 
Size Natural logarithm of  market value: Ln (MV) 
 
Leverage Total debt/total assets  WC03255/ WC02999 
 
  
Capital expenditures 
 
Capital expenditures/ total assets: WC04601/ WC02999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Calculation of CPS variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of CEO pay slice (CPS) using BoardEx 
database data for the AEGIS GROUP PLC (ISIN GB00B4JV1B90) for the year 1997. Total 
compensation is a total compensation including salary, bonuses, and equity-based 
compensation per executive director.  The Rank is an executives’ rank by total compensation. 
The proportion of CEO compensation to the total compensation of total five executives 
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including CEO (CPS) is the total compensation of CEO to the sum of total compensations of 
top five executives..  
Director Rank Total Compensation 
Sir Crispin Henry Davis (CEO) 1 971 
Kai  Hiemstra 2 793 
Eryck  Rebbouh 3 483 
Bruno  Kemoun 4 476 
Colin Richard Day 5 432 
Raymond (Ray) F Kelly 6 341 
   
   
   
   
Total Compensation of top five executives  3,155 
Total CEO Compensation  971 
CPS  971/3,155=0.3078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Calculation of Board Busyness variables 
This is an example calculation for our measures of director busyness using BoardEx database 
data for the SAFEWAY PLC (ISIN GB0000492412) for the year 1997. Total number of 
directorships counts the number of directorships (total number of current quoted boards 
including the “home” company) held by all directors serving on the board. Directorships per 
director are estimated as the total number of directorships held by the directors of the board 
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divided by board size. Board Busyness is the number of directors holding three or more board 
seats divided by board size.  
Director Total Directorships 
Colin Deverell Smith 1 
David Gordon Webster 3 
Gordon  Wotherspoon 1 
Patricia (Pat) Anne O'Driscoll 1 
Robert George Charters 1 
Simon Timothy Laffin 1 
Sir Alistair  Grant 4 
Doctor Neville Clifford Bain 4 
Julia Ann Burdus 4 
Michael John Allen 
 
 
2 
Total Directorships 22 
Directorships per Director 22/10 = 2.2 
Board busyness 4/10 = 0.4 (40%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 692 firms for 1997- 2010 time period, 
excluding financial firms. All variables are winzorized to the 1
st
 /99
th
 percentiles. All variable 
definitions are in the Table 1.  
 
Mean Min Max Observation 
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Panel A: Crash Risk  
    
 
Tail risk 
Negative conditional skewness 
Extreme sigma 
  
0.14 
0.12 
2.88 
 
0.01 
-7.15 
0.37 
 
2.24 
7.18 
6.97 
 
5312 
5312 
5312 
     
 
Panel B: Compensation/Director/ 
Board characteristics 
    
 
CPS 
 
0.45 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
 
5038 
Board busyness 
Board composition 
0.17 
0.48 
0.00 
0.20 
0.67 
0.80 
5312 
5312 
Board size 1.93 1.10 2.71 5312 
Board duality 0.09 0.00 1.00 5312 
CEO tenure 5.16 0.00 24.70 5312 
CEO outsider 0.54 0.00 1.00 5312 
 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
    
 
Size 
 
4.65 
 
-1.90 
 
11.97 
 
5310 
Capex/Total Assets 0.05 0.00 0.34 5302 
Leverage 0.18 0.00 0.95 5311 
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Table 5 
Corporate Governance Characteristics and Stock price crash risk 
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional skewness and 
extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate governance and financial 
data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and  2010. All variable definitions are in 
Table 1. mi  is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error 
term.  Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Tail Risk Neg.Cond Skewness Extreme Sigma 
Crash Riskt-1 
 
0.1515*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0760*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0547*** 
(0.0096) 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 0.0585*** 
(0.0058) 
0.3576*** 
(0.1001) 
0.3150*** 
(0.0826) 
Board busyness 0.0922*** 
(0.0118) 
0.5389*** 
 (0.1563) 
0.6166*** 
(0.1256) 
Board composition
 
-0.0577*** 
(0.0158) 
-1.1851*** 
(0.2453) 
-0.3803** 
(0.1850) 
Board size 0.1469*** 
(0.0058) 
1.6762*** 
(0.0991) 
1.1753*** 
(0.0834) 
Duality -0.0019*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0524*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0332*** 
(0.0078) 
CEO tenure -0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0107** 
(0.0049) 
0.0156*** 
(0.0038) 
CEO outsider -0.0019*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0215*** 
(0.0042) 
Size -0.0618*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.4682*** 
(0.0184) 
1.0200*** 
(0.0424) 
Capex 0.0900*** 
(0.0305) 
1.5913*** 
(0.3893) 
1.1100*** 
(0.2700) 
Leverage 0.0565*** 
(0.0113) 
0.6342*** 
(0.1389) 
0.4718*** 
(0.1101) 
Constant  
 
 
m1 
 
m2  
 
Hansen J 
0.1986*** 
(0.0187) 
 
0.000 
 
0.561 
 
0.149 
-0.2751 
(0.2854) 
 
0.000 
 
0.163 
 
0.208 
2.3460*** 
(0.2225) 
 
0.000 
 
0.849 
 
0.270 
 
Year dummy
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of observations 
 
4374 
 
4374 
 
4374 
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Table 6 
Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The effect of Industry Competition 
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional skewness and 
extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate governance and financial 
data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and  2010. All variable definitions are in 
Table 1. mi  is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error 
term.  Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tail Risk Neg.Cond. Skewness Extreme Sigma 
Industry 
competition 
Low High Low High Low High 
Information 
asymmetry 
High Low High Low High Low 
Crash Riskt-1 
 
0.1782*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0886*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0166*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0599*** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0327*** 
(0.00536) 
CEO Pay Slice (CPS) 0.0625*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0218*** 
(0.0030) 
0.6400*** 
(0.0455) 
0.0826 
(0.0564) 
0.4107*** 
(0.0348) 
0.0329*** 
(0.0495) 
Board busyness 0.0970*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0807*** 
(0.0053) 
0.8334*** 
 (0.0508) 
0.4435*** 
 (0.1019) 
0.5200*** 
(0.0557) 
0.6478*** 
(0.0741) 
Board composition
 
0.0060 
(0.0066) 
-0.0416*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.6668*** 
(0.1011) 
-0.1813 
(0.2453) 
-0.6788*** 
(0.0793) 
0.1566 
(0.0962) 
Board size 0.1163*** 
(0.0026) 
0.1271*** 
(0.0033) 
1.6667*** 
(0.0448) 
1.6249*** 
(0.0618) 
1.1538*** 
(0.0272) 
1.1511*** 
(0.0561) 
Duality 0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0042*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0792*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0038 
(0.0031) 
-0.0460*** 
(0.0043) 
CEO tenure 0.0022*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0321** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0212** 
(0.0033) 
0.0332*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0125*** 
(0.0024) 
CEO outsider -0.0016*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0319*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0264*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0199*** 
(0.0022) 
Size -0.0638*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0638*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.3830*** 
(0.0068) 
-0.4851*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.3377*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.4226*** 
(0.0092) 
Capex 0.1798*** 
(0.0109) 
0.1282*** 
(0.0118) 
0.7245*** 
(0.1194) 
3.3722*** 
(0.1872) 
1.0732*** 
(0.0846) 
1.9189*** 
(0.1800) 
Leverage 0.0364*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0752*** 
(0.0054) 
0.1733*** 
(0.0740) 
0.5840*** 
(0.0850) 
0.0171*** 
(0.0500) 
0.2194*** 
(0.0734) 
Constant  
 
m1 
m2  
Hansen J 
0.2479*** 
(0.0068) 
0.000 
0.539 
0.882 
0.2528*** 
(0.0086) 
0.000 
0.226 
0.766 
-1.1722 
(0.1120) 
0.000 
0.100 
0.868 
-0.3828* 
(0.1966) 
0.000 
0.194 
0.708 
2.2268*** 
(0.0611) 
0.000 
0.376 
0.866 
2.8838*** 
(0.1581) 
0.000 
0.256 
0.602 
Year dummy
 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
1989 2019 1989 2019 1989 2019 
Table 7 
Corporate Governance and Stock Price Crashes: The effect of the Financial Crisis 
2007/2008 
This table reports results from an analysis of crash risk measured by tail risk, negative conditional skewness and 
extreme sigma in our sample of 692 firms (4374 observations) for which corporate governance and financial 
data are available for at least five consecutive years between 1997 and  2010. Crisis is a dummy variable, which 
is equal to one for years 2007 and 2008, and zero otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Table 1. mi  is a 
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Hansen J is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as χ2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term.  
Standard errors are in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tail Risk Neg.Cond.Skewness Extreme Sigma 
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Crash Riskt-1 
 
0.1518*** 
(0.0063) 
0.1532*** 
(0.0063) 
0.0753*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0729*** 
(0.0088) 
0.0553*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0579*** 
(0.0536) 
CEO Pay Slice 
(CPS) 
0.0650*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0568*** 
(0.0063) 
0.4651*** 
(0.1024) 
0.3634*** 
(0.0973) 
0.4003*** 
(0.1006) 
0.3323*** 
(0.0851) 
Crisis 0.0316*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0532*** 
(0.0039) 
0.1034 
(0.1288) 
0.1182* 
(0.0653) 
0.1508 
(0.0966) 
0.0170 
(0.0517) 
CPS x Crisis -0.0385*** 
(0.0130) 
 -0.1770 
(0.2558) 
 0.1766 
(0.1955) 
 
Board busyness 0.0834*** 
(0.0054) 
0.1592*** 
(0.0107) 
0.5638*** 
 (0.1570) 
1.2173*** 
 (0.1207) 
0.6401*** 
(0.1323) 
0.9006*** 
(0.1127) 
Board Busyness x 
Crisis 
 0.0091 
(0.0126) 
 -0.4796* 
(0.2574) 
 -0.3373** 
(0.1843) 
Board composition
 
-0.0710 
(0.0145) 
-0.0654*** 
(0.0142) 
-1.2638*** 
(0.2410) 
-1.2055*** 
(0.2257) 
-0.4636 
(0.1879) 
-0.3428* 
(0.1956) 
Board size 0.1474*** 
(0.0058) 
0.1453*** 
(0.0059) 
1.6700*** 
(0.0964) 
1.7064*** 
(0.0965) 
1.1864*** 
(0.0739) 
1.1648*** 
(0.0759) 
Duality -0.0018*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0439*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0309 
(0.0077) 
-0.0290*** 
(0.0074) 
CEO tenure -0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0107** 
(0.0048) 
0.0097** 
(0.0048) 
0.0158*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0038) 
CEO outsider -0.0019*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0202*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0220*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0041) 
Size -0.0614*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0602*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.4674*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.4737*** 
(0.0151) 
-0.3927*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.4226*** 
(0.0092) 
Capex 0.0815*** 
(0.0303) 
0.0814*** 
(0.0304) 
1.5624*** 
(0.3883) 
1.8559*** 
(0.3348) 
1.1087*** 
(0.2718) 
1.1770*** 
(0.2544) 
Leverage 0.0615*** 
(0.0115) 
0.0577*** 
(0.0110) 
0.6429*** 
(0.1406) 
0.4965*** 
(0.1476) 
0.0503*** 
(0.1292) 
0.4555*** 
(0.1306) 
Constant  
 
 
m1 
m2  
Hansen J 
0.2027*** 
(0.0180) 
 
0.000 
0.568 
0.151 
0.1767*** 
(0.0172) 
 
0.000 
0.519 
0.100 
-0.2744 
(0.2764) 
 
0.000 
0.161 
0.208 
-0.4972* 
(0.2854) 
 
0.000 
0.194 
0.708 
2.3411*** 
(0.2274) 
 
0.000 
0.817 
0.278 
2.1834*** 
(0.2189) 
 
0.000 
0.856 
0.311 
Year dummy
 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
4374 4374 4374 4374 4374 4374 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
